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CONSTITUTIONAL PANDEMIC
SURVEILLANCE
MATTHEW B. KUGLER* & MARIANA OLIVER**
How do people view governmental pandemic surveillance? And how
can their views inform courts considering the constitutionality of digital
monitoring programs aimed at containing the spread of a highly contagious
diseases? We measure the perceived intrusiveness of pandemic surveillance
through two nationally representative surveys of Americans. Our results
show that even at the height of a pandemic people find surveillance for public
health to be more intrusive than surveillance for traditional law enforcement
purposes. To account for these strong privacy concerns, we propose
safeguards that we believe would make cell phone location tracking and
other similar digital monitoring regimes constitutionally reasonable.
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INTRODUCTION
As the COVID-19 pandemic hit the United States in early 2020,
Americans were inundated with media reports about novel forms of public
health surveillance. Apple and Google formed a partnership to create a
smartphone contact tracing application.1 News sites began to create “mobility
trend” reports that showed how much smartphone users were moving about,
week to week, in different states and cities.2 And media organizations
produced sharable visuals showing how the cell phones of those gathered in
particular locations at particular times, such as Florida beachgoers on a busy
weekend, then dispersed across the nation.3
Alongside their infotainment value, these displays also showed the
potential power of digital pandemic monitoring. Want to enforce a 14-day
quarantine period for those entering your state?4 You could troll social media
1

Chris Ip, The Importance of Apple and Google’s Rare Collaboration on Contact
Tracing, ENGADGET (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.engadget.com/apple-google-contact-tracin
g-explainer-170056298.html [https://perma.cc/8U7Q-PGE7].
2
Justine Coleman, Apple Now Sharing Mobility Data from Apple Maps to Help Public
Health Authorities, HILL (Apr. 14, 2020, 3:28 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/tec
hnology/492763-apple-now-sharing-mobility-data-from-apple-maps-to-help-public [https://p
erma.cc/4QM3-REHV].
3
Jason Murdock, Mobile Phone Location Data of Florida Beachgoers During Spring
Break Tracked to Show Potential Coronavirus Spread, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 27, 2020, 11:11
AM), https://www.newsweek.com/x-mode-tectonix-coronavirus-heat-map-tracking-mobiledata-covid-19-spring-break-1494663 [https://perma.cc/M8MY-FQ5P].
4
See generally Katherine Rosenberg-Douglas, Chicago’s Travel Quarantine Order Adds
2 States and D.C. to Orange List, Knocks 1 Off Red List. Here’s What You Need to Know to
Avoid a Large Fine., CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune.com/coronavir
us/ct-cb-coronavirus-chicago-self-quarantine-rules-to-know-20200729-rzt3x7jj5fbsxi2ewq4
oxvgs5i-story.html [https://perma.cc/Z3VJ-XE32] (stating that anyone who spent more than a
day in any of 26 states should quarantine upon their return or face fines of up to $500 per day);
Ted Armus, They Were Arrested and Jailed for Breaking a Quarantine Order. They’re Not
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for vacation photos, or you could monitor whose cell phones entered the state
and then evaluate how much those phones moved once they arrived. You
could also use this data for contact tracing by flagging phones that have been
near those of a person who was discovered to be infected.5
This kind of surveillance was not uncommon overseas in the spring of
2020. Many other countries were using cell phone location data—sometimes
GPS, sometimes Bluetooth—to track the movements of infected people and
enforce quarantine orders.6 Countries including China, Taiwan, Israel, and
South Korea also used this data for contact tracing.7 Though digital tracing
has been used in the past, the scale of these efforts dwarfed anything
previously seen.8
These overseas developments prompted considerable discussion about
whether the U.S. Constitution permits mass digital pandemic surveillance,
particularly through innovative use of cell phone location data.9 Though the
Fourth Amendment has been most discussed in the context of criminal
investigations, the Amendment’s protection against “unreasonable searches
and seizures” applies to all government information gathering programs, not
just criminal ones.10 Both a public health contact tracing program and a law
enforcement-directed quarantine enforcement program would have to
comply with it.

the First., WASH. POST (July 31, 2020, 6:02 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/20
20/07/31/arrest-breaking-quarantine-covid-florida/ [https://perma.cc/2C98-MFR6] (review-i
ng examples of criminal quarantine enforcement).
5
Chas Kissick, Elliot Setzer & Jacob Schulz, What Ever Happened to Digital Contact
Tracing?, LAWFARE (July 21, 2020, 1:36 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-ever-happ
ened-digital-contact-tracing [https://perma.cc/RC9U-KNV5].
6
Isobel Asher Hamilton, Compulsory Selfies and Contact-Tracing: Authorities
Everywhere Are Using Smartphones to Track the Coronavirus, and It’s Part of a Massive
Increase in Global Surveillance, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 14, 2020, 10:30 AM), https://www.busi
nessinsider.com/countries-tracking-citizens-phones-coronavirus-2020-3 [https://perma.cc/R
HM2-6T3F].
7
Kim Lyons, Governments Around the World Are Increasingly Using Location Data to
Manage the Coronavirus, VERGE (Mar. 23, 2020, 2:21 PM), https://www.theverge.com/
2020/3/23/21190700/eu-mobile-carriers-customer-data-coronavirus-south-korea-taiwan-priv
acy [https://perma.cc/3YBX-ZQEP].
8
See infra notes 169, 182.
9
See, e.g., Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Disease Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment,
LAWFARE (Apr. 7, 2020, 1:54 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/disease-surveillance-andfourth-amendment [https://perma.cc/2NSH-4VRY] (describing Fourth Amendment issues);
Elliot Setzer, Contact-Tracing Apps in the United States, LAWFARE (May 6, 2020, 4:08 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/contact-tracing-apps-united-states [https://perma.cc/59NP-99
XN] (reviewing the landscape of apps).
10
See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
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As we explore in Part I, Fourth Amendment doctrine is unfortunately
poorly developed outside the context of law enforcement investigations.
When the government is engaged in information collection for “special
needs” beyond “general crime control,” the constitutionality of the program
is assessed using a relatively free-form reasonableness balancing test.11 This
analysis could easily be criticized as ill-defined, with each “special need”
search domain being so individuated as to lack common principles.12 As
special needs cases span many different topics—from border searches to
public schooling to government personnel management—there is indeed
much variation.13 Nevertheless, the cases continually emphasize some
common factors: the distinctiveness of the person or relationship giving rise
to the search, the intrusiveness of the search, the potential for arbitrary
enforcement to lead to abuse, and the strength of the government’s interest
in conducting the search.
Because intrusiveness is a central part of the special needs analysis, in
Part II we seek to quantify the intrusiveness of pandemic surveillance relative
to the better understood category of law enforcement surveillance. This
follows a tradition of Fourth Amendment scholarship that uses public opinion
data to better understand privacy values.14 Consistent with this scholarly
approach, we conducted two studies with a total of almost 2,400 participants
in the spring and summer of 2020—the height of the pandemic in the U.S.
The data from these studies show that people view surveillance aimed
at controlling a health pandemic as even more intrusive than surveillance
aimed at facilitating the traditional activities of law enforcement. For
example, surveillance conducted by public health agents for contact tracing
and by police to enforce a stay-at-home order are both considered more
intrusive than traditional law enforcement monitoring. People felt this way
during the height of the first wave of the pandemic in early April 2020, and
they still felt this way after the United States had experienced over 100,000
deaths attributable to COVID-19 in June 2020. This surprising result—
doubly shocking given the context of thousands of COVID deaths per day
and an almost universal lockdown during the first round of data collection—
should be taken seriously by public health officials and political leaders
aiming to assess the privacy cost of mass pandemic surveillance.
11

See infra Section I.B.
See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits
of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149, 1150–
52 (1998) (arguing that Fourth Amendment law is full of conceptually “local” issues and that
attempts to extract a general theory of the Fourth Amendment are doomed to frustration).
13
See infra notes 66–91.
14
See infra notes 103–111.
12
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In Part III we apply the results from these surveys to a Fourth
Amendment reasonableness analysis to assess what kind of pandemic
surveillance would be constitutionally acceptable. Though some
technologies that are useful for pandemic surveillance fall outside of
traditional Fourth Amendment protection, the most useful—cell phone
location data—is generally covered. Because digital contact tracing by public
health authorities likely falls within the special needs category, courts must
balance the intrusiveness of the search versus the public benefit. Given the
public’s perception of the extreme intrusiveness of the searches, this article
suggests that tight controls and safeguards are needed to make digital contact
tracing reasonable. Absent those controls, such surveillance likely violates
the Fourth Amendment and the constitutional right to information privacy.
This article therefore proposes guidelines that would minimize the
constitutional problems raised by pandemic surveillance, drawing inspiration
from the regime for prescription drug tracking that the Supreme Court
approved in Whalen v. Roe.15
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCHES IN THE PANDEMIC CONTEXT
The Fourth Amendment requires that government searches be
reasonable.16 This means that when engaging in Fourth Amendment analysis,
one first asks whether an act of government information collection
constitutes a “search” and then, second, whether the search is a reasonable
one.17
Currently, Fourth Amendment law is deeply unsettled about whether
precisely the kinds of surveillance most at issue in the COVID context
constitute searches.18 Specifically, the kinds of pandemic surveillance that
have been considered include cell phone location data, surveillance video
footage from cameras in public places, video from drones, facial recognition
technology, and credit and utility records.19 Entire papers have been written
15

429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (guaranteeing the people’s right to be free from “unreasonable
searches and seizures”).
17
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018) (if a search, must assess
reasonableness); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) (no warrant required if not
a search).
18
See infra Section I.A.
19
See Deborah Brown & Amos Toh, Technology Is Enabling Surveillance, Inequality
During the Pandemic, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 4, 2021, 12:01 AM), https://www.hrw.org/ne
ws/2021/03/04/technology-enabling-surveillance-inequality-during-pandemic [https://perma.
cc/GNQ5-TZ3L]; Seth Colaner, The Technologies the World Is Using to Track Coronavirus
— and People, VENTUREBEAT (May 18, 2020, 9:16 AM), https://venturebeat.com/2020/05/1
8/the-technologies-the-world-is-using-to-track-coronavirus-and-people/
16
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about whether using some of those sources of information would normally
qualify as a “search” under normal conditions.20 In Section I.A, this article
will briefly review the extent of that uncertainty. In Section I.B, this article
will examine the kinds of law enforcement searches that count as special
needs searches. In Section I.C this article will turn to the role of intrusiveness
in evaluating the reasonableness of non-law enforcement searches.
A. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GATHERING AND THE DIGITAL
REVOLUTION

Five of the seven scenarios used in Part II’s study of pandemic-related
attitudes are fundamentally about companies’ business records.21 These
include: cell phone location information, credit card information, and utility
information. Of these, cell phone location information is by far the most
important and most discussed in the pandemic context; it can directly track
the movements of infected people and their contacts.
Under the third-party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment has historically
granted no protection for this type of consumer business record.22 The
government’s acquisition of this information is not considered a “search” for
Fourth Amendment purposes and therefore courts do not even reach the
question of whether the acquisition is reasonable.23 Essentially, the
information is treated as non-private. The basic logic is that people have
voluntarily chosen to share their customer information with the third-party
company, and therefore have abandoned their privacy interest in it.24
The shape of Fourth Amendment law has shifted substantially over the
last 10 years, however. In United States v. Jones,25 two concurring opinions
[https://perma.cc/9LT7-W2PM]; Dave Gershgorn, We Mapped How the Coronavirus Is
Driving New Surveillance Programs Around the World, ONEZERO (Apr. 9, 2020), https://on
ezero.medium.com/the-pandemic-is-a-trojan-horse-for-surveillance-programs-around-the-w
orld-887fa6f12ec9 [https://perma.cc/S9WP-8RD7].
20
See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Facial Recognition and the Fourth Amendment,
105 MINN. L. REV. 1105 (2021); Matthew B. Kugler & Meredith Hurley, Protecting Energy
Privacy Across the Public/Private Divide, 72 FLA. L. REV. 451 (2020); Emma Lux, Privacy
in the Dumps: Analyzing Cell Tower Dumps Under the Fourth Amendment, 57 AMER. CRIM.
L. REV. 109 (2020); Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations
of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at
“Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society”, 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 738 tbl.1 (1993)
(bank records).
21
See infra note 125.
22
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (finding no expectation of privacy in
a customer’s bank records).
23
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979).
24
See, e.g., Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (bank records); Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (call records).
25
565 U.S. 400 at 413–31 (2012).
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by a total of five Justices suggested that the aggregation of many pieces of
public location information by means of electronic tracking might give rise
to a privacy expectation.26 The Court went on to carve out a technologysensitive rule in Riley v. California, holding that the otherwise broadly
permissive search incident-to-arrest doctrine did not allow for warrantless
searches of cell phones, even though police could search other personal
effects without a warrant.27 Finally, the Court’s response to the digital
revolution reached the third-party doctrine in Carpenter v. United States.28
There, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment protection
extends to law enforcement searches of historical cell-site location
information stored by phone providers, exempting these data from the thirdparty doctrine.29 Using cell phone location data for criminal investigations
therefore required a warrant.30
In Carpenter, Chief Justice Roberts noted two ways in which cell phone
location data is not like the kinds of information discussed in prior cases.
First, he explained that the conveyance of location information to cell phone
providers was not really “voluntary” because cell phones connect to towers
automatically and carrying a cell phone is “indispensable to participation in
modern society.”31 Second, Roberts emphasized the uniquely revealing
nature of historical cell location data.32 Cellular location data is generated
26
For discussions of the logic of the concurring opinions, see for example Matthew B.
Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations of Privacy, Fourth Amendment
Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory, SUP. CT. REV. 205, 207–09 (2015); DANIEL J. SOLOVE &
PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 334 (5th ed. 2015) (“Both concurring
opinions, involving five justices, embraced a new theory of privacy. In previous cases, the
Court has focused extensively on whether something . . . was exposed to the public. The
concurrences recognize that extensive and aggregated surveillance can violate a reasonable
expectation of privacy regardless of whether or not such surveillance occurred in public.”);
Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 313
(2012) (“The concurring opinions in Jones raise the intriguing possibility that a five-justice
majority of the Supreme Court is ready to endorse a new mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment
protection.”).
27
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 399–401 (2014). The search incident-to-arrest
doctrine would allow an extensive search of any other possessions on the person of the
arrestee. Id. at 400 (mentioning bank statements, photos, wallets, etc.).
28
138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
29
See id. at 2217. Cell-site location information is created when cell phones connect to
cell towers, which modern phones do extremely frequently. This information can be used to
pinpoint the location of the phone to a moderate degree of precision. See id. at 2219
(suggesting that companies could then locate a phone within 50 meters, with increased
accuracy likely over time).
30
Id. at 2221.
31
Id. at 2220.
32
See id. at 2216–17.
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every time a phone connects to a cell tower, which modern devices do
continuously, and therefore this data can be a moment-by-moment catalogue
of a cell phone user’s movements.33
Carpenter establishes that at least some uses of cell phone location
information will count as searches under the Fourth Amendment. But
Roberts specifically reserved the questions of real-time cellular location
monitoring and “tower dumps,” downloads of information on all the devices
that connected to a particular cell-site during a particular interval because
they are potentially less intrusive.34 So those uses may, or may not, be
searches.
Carpenter may also indicate that other business records are now due
Fourth Amendment protection. Specifically concerning Part II’s scenarios,35
Matthew Kugler and Meredith Hurley explained how the rise of smart meters
for the tracking of electrical power consumption has fundamentally changed
the privacy interests at stake in utility records.36 Utility companies now may
gather thousands of datapoints a month about a person’s energy usage,
allowing them to accurately deduce many things about the activities
occurring in the protected space of the home.37 This arguably makes a
warrant requirement for law enforcement use of smart meter data appropriate
under Carpenter despite the clear pre-2010 case law denying Fourth
Amendment protection.38 This same reasoning can be used to question
whether the failure to protect bank records is viable under Carpenter’s logic
given the changes in credit card usage since the 1970s.39 Bank records may
be useful in the pandemic context as they would reveal patterns of movement
and purchases. Courts have not yet reached these questions, however, and
they do not seem likely to do so in the near future.
The other two scenarios in Part II (drones and facial recognition)
concern privacy in public spaces.40 In general, the Court does not recognize
a person’s right to privacy from government observation when they are on

33

See id. at 2211.
Id. at 2220.
35
See infra note 125.
36
Kugler & Hurley, supra note 20, at 460–74.
37
Id. at 469–74.
38
Id. at 485–92; but see Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900
F.3d 521, 527–28 (7th Cir. 2018) (finding an expectation of privacy in smart meter data under
Carpenter but holding that installing and collecting data from smart meters was a reasonable
regulatory search).
39
Kugler & Hurley, supra note 20, at 487–89.
40
See infra note 125.
34
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public streets.41 This is true whether a police officer is standing on a public
street and sees into a person’s yard, or whether the government installs a
camera on a utility pole with the same view.42 Even observation from lowflying aircraft to see into areas obscured from street-level view has been held
to not be a search under the Fourth Amendment.43
These cases predate the rise of easy electronic video recording and facial
recognition, however.44 Some courts have questioned whether prolonged use
of pole cameras to observe private property raises Fourth Amendment issues
under Jones,45 which was about prolonged GPS monitoring of a car on public
streets, but so far this is a minority view.46
Some scholars have also raised concerns about the combination of
public cameras and facial recognition technology. Andrew Ferguson, for
example, believes that the Jones-Riley-Carpenter line of cases supports a
series of principles that he applies to require limited Fourth Amendment
protection against facial recognition.47 Specifically he thinks that universal
and pervasive facial recognition surveillance implicates Fourth Amendment

41

California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (stating that there is no expectation of
privacy in that which can be seen from a public vantage point).
42
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983) (noting that “[n]othing in the Fourth
Amendment prohibit[s] the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them
at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afford[s] them . . . .”).
43
See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–51 (1989); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213–14.
44
See generally Ferguson, supra note 20 (discussing the privacy implications of growing
facial recognition use by the government) and Matthew B. Kugler, From Identification to
Identity Theft: Public Perceptions of Biometric Privacy Harms, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 107
(2019) (discussing private uses).
45
See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251 (“This type of
surveillance provokes an immediate negative visceral reaction: indiscriminate video
surveillance raises the spectre of the Orwellian state.”); see also Order Granting Defendant’s
Motion to Suppress at 20, United States v. Vargas, No. CR-13-6025-EFS (E.D. Wash. Dec.
15, 2014) (similarly distinguishing prolonged video monitoring because it “is so different in
its intrusiveness that it does not qualify as a plain-view observation.”); United States v.
Anderson-Bagshaw, 509 F. App’x 396, 405 (6th Cir. 2012); State v. Jones, 903 N.W.2d 101,
113–14 (S.D. 2017) (holding that pole camera surveillance of a front yard for two months is a
Fourth Amendment violation).
46
See, e.g., United States v. Kay, 2018 WL 3995902, at *1, 3 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 21, 2018)
(holding that 87 days of video surveillance is not a search under Carpenter); United States v.
Houston, 813 F.3d 282, 287–88 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 567 (2016); see also
United States v. Cantu, 684 F. App’x 703, 703 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v. Brooks,
911 F. Supp. 2d 836, 843 (D. Ariz. 2012) (holding that law enforcement’s use of a pole camera
for long-term surveillance did not violate Fourth Amendment protections).
47
Ferguson, supra note 20 at 1129–40.
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protection while more isolated use or use only in real time does not.48 But
thus far no court has reached this result.
The very technologies that are most directly relevant to pandemic
surveillance, then, have a somewhat questionable status under the Fourth
Amendment. Carpenter settles that historic cell-site location information is
protected, however,49 and that gives us some comfort in concluding that at
least some pandemic surveillance will raise Fourth Amendment issues.
Several of the other methods used for pandemic surveillance—utility records
or facial recognition—may raise Fourth Amendment issues as well, but this
would require some expansion of existing doctrine.
B. NON-LAW ENFORCEMENT SEARCHES UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT

The question “what is a search?” operates the same under the Fourth
Amendment for both the law enforcement and non-law enforcement
contexts, but the consequences of concluding that an action is a search are
different outside the traditional law enforcement context. For law
enforcement, courts default to requiring a warrant based on probable cause
(or one of the specific exceptions to the warrant requirement).50 When the
goal of a search is not criminal law enforcement, when it is a “special needs”
search, however, courts appear to assume that it is less problematic and less
intrusive to conduct surveillance.51 Courts evaluating a non-law enforcement
“search” therefore conduct a reasonableness balancing analysis that weighs
the intrusiveness of the search against the expected government benefits of
that search rather than requiring probable cause and a warrant.52
The basic logic is that there are non-law enforcement situations in which
the Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause requirements are
“impracticable.”53 In these instances the warrant requirement may be relaxed,
such that a lesser amount of individualized suspicion is required and judicial
48
Id. at 1142 (“[P]rinciples point to this type of generalized surveillance (identifying
everyone, everywhere, for all time) being deemed a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes.”); id. at 1146–47 (“Under a Carpenter analysis, one might imagine the Supreme
Court allowing real-time scans in certain locations, under certain circumstances (special
events, targeted locations). However, generalized use for suspicionless surveillance would run
afoul of Fourth Amendment search principles.”).
49
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018).
50
See id. at 2221.
51
See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967) (“We may agree that a routine
inspection of the physical condition of private property is a less hostile intrusion than the
typical policeman’s search for the fruits and instrumentalities of crime.”).
52
See, e.g., Camara, 387 U.S. at 536–37.
53
See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 756 (2010).
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pre-approval is not necessary.54 A search based on no individualized
suspicion—a dragnet—may also be reasonable “[i]n limited circumstances,
where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where
an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be
placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion . . . .”55
Many special needs searches are of people who, by virtue of their status
or activities, have reduced expectations of privacy. The canonical examples
are public school students and government employees. “[S]tudents within the
school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the
population generally” and can be subjected to a variety of intrusions in the
form of a search or seizure.56 Student athletes have further reduced
expectations, as they have voluntarily chosen to seek the benefits of an
extracurricular program.57 The Supreme Court has used similar logic in the
government employment context. It has explained that the “operational
realities of the workplace” make it unreasonable for public employees to
expect the same level of privacy protections as everyday citizens.58 Those
government employees who have or are seeking positions of particular trust
and confidence have further reduced expectations based on their voluntary
pursuit of those positions.59
COVID-19 surveillance fits somewhat oddly among this class of
searches. COVID-19 surveillance would necessarily apply to anyone who is
or could become infected, meaning everyone is fair game. This is the
opposite of the canonical special needs case, where some distinguishing
factor is used to emphasize the reduced privacy expectations of the subject
class relative to those of the general public.60 With COVID-19, we are
surveilling the general public.

54
See Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. v. Vilsack, 681 F.3d 483, 489 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“Even
where the government claims ‘special needs,’ a warrantless search is generally unreasonable
unless based on ‘some quantum of individualized suspicion.’”) (citing Skinner v. Ry. Lab.
Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989)).
55
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
56
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656–57 (1995) (quoting New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring)).
57
Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 657 (1995) (likening student athletes to a “closely
regulated industry”).
58
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987).
59
See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670 (1989) (“It is readily
apparent that the Government has a compelling interest in ensuring that front-line interdiction
personnel are physically fit, and have unimpeachable integrity and judgment.”).
60
See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972) (upholding search and
seizure in the context of a pawnshop selling firearms); United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d
496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) (air passengers), cited with approval in Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union,
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The closest parallel to this kind of dragnet surveillance among the
traditional special needs cases comes from highway checkpoints. Though
automobile ownership is widespread and travel by car is almost universal, 61
automotive travel has always been treated as a special case. Automobiles are
held to be subject to reduced expectations of privacy not just from their
various characteristics (ready mobility, large windows, travel in public
spaces), but also due to the intrusive regulation imposed on them itself;
people should know better (in the view of courts) than to expect privacy in
such a regulated device.62
Suspicionless dragnet stops of drivers at checkpoints are constitutional
under the right circumstances. First, such stops must be for purposes other
than the detection of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.63 When the purpose is
general crime control—such as mass license and registration checks
(Edmond)—the Court “decline[s] to suspend the usual requirement of
individualized suspicion.”64 Second, these checkpoint stops must be brief.
This is consistent with the comment in Skinner that the privacy intrusions of
dragnet searches should be “minimal.”65 The Supreme Court has therefore
approved sobriety checkpoints aimed at removing drunk drivers from the
road (Sitz),66 brief information-seeking stops searches for witnesses to a hit
and run (Lidster),67 and searches of vehicles near the national border to
intercept undocumented migrants (Martinez-Fuerte).68
The emphasis on purposes beyond general crime control is also on
display in one of the few special needs cases that is about public health:

489 U.S. at 675 n.3; Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (probationers); In re J.G.,
701 A.2d 1260, 1274–75 (1997) (sex offenders being tested for HIV).
61
See SARAH A. SEO, POLICING THE OPEN ROAD 118–20 (2019) (describing how the
combination of automobiles and prohibition led to the first widespread encounters between
law enforcement and everyday citizens); id. at 119 (“It was significant that Prohibition’s
offenders were not limited to the unsavory sort.”).
62
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424–25 (2004); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386,
392 (1985) (“These reduced expectations of privacy derive not from the fact that the area to
be searched is in plain view, but from the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling
on the public highways.”).
63
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37–38 (2000) (“[W]e have upheld certain
regimes of suspicionless searches where the program was designed to serve ‘special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement.’ . . . In none of these cases, however, did we
indicate approval of a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of
ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”).
64
Id. at 44.
65
Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989).
66
Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990).
67
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 421 (2004).
68
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976).
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Ferguson v. City of Charleston.69 There, the Court held that drug tests of
pregnant mothers were unreasonable given the policy’s law enforcement
purpose.70 The public hospital in Charleston began testing the urine of
pregnant women who were suspected of being cocaine users with the aim of
directing them to substance abuse programs.71 The hospital worked closely
with law enforcement and notified them of patients who twice tested positive
or who missed appointments with substance abuse counselors.72 This was a
stick to encourage compliance.73 Key in this case was the problem of
“unauthorized dissemination” to “third parties.”74 The hospital could run the
tests if, in its medical judgment, they were wise and beneficial to the
patients.75 But it could not run them for the purpose of providing information
to law enforcement without falling out of the special needs category.76
Applied to the COVID-19 context, these factors suggest that public
health agents using something like cellular location data for contact tracing
could fall within the special needs category; the purpose is not traditional law
enforcement, and the warrant and probable cause requirements are
completely impractical. The remaining question for this surveillance
program is whether this special needs search is sufficiently “reasonable” to
be constitutional as a dragnet, as was the case with some traffic stops.
Using that same cellular location information to enforce a quarantine,
particularly a quarantine of the general population, is less likely to count as
a special needs search. The purpose is public health rather than preventing
the usual social ills that accompany crime, but this was also true in
Ferguson.77 The question would ultimately turn on how distinct the
quarantine enforcement regime was from the traditional law enforcement
objective of general crime control. If a quarantine enforcement regime turned
into an exercise in mass citation writing, one could question whether the goal
was sufficiently closely aligned to pandemic enforcement to fit within the
special needs category.

69

532 U.S. 67 (2001).
Id. at 83–85.
71
Id. at 70.
72
Id. at 72.
73
See id.
74
Id. at 78.
75
Id. at 79–81 (distinguishing “this case from circumstances in which physicians or
psychologists, in the course of ordinary medical procedures aimed at helping the patient
herself, come across information that under rules of law or ethics is subject to reporting
requirements . . . .”).
76
Id. at 83–85.
77
Id. at 70.
70
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C. REASONABLENESS BALANCING IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Even once a search falls within this special needs exception, courts must
still “balance the individual’s privacy expectations against the Government’s
interests” to determine if the search is reasonable.78 This inquiry is stressed
to be a “context-specific” investigation of “the competing private and public
interests advanced by the parties.”79 Courts must consider the nature of the
privacy interest allegedly compromised by the search, “the character of the
intrusion imposed” by the government, and “the nature and immediacy of the
government’s concerns and the efficacy of the [search] in meeting them.”80
The Court has weighed these factors in several distinct ways. First, the
Court has often emphasized the degree of intrusion present in special needs
searches. In a case about student athlete drug testing, the Court emphasized
that the actual collection of the urine sample was relatively inoffensive, with
athletes forced into no greater exposure than was common in communal
restrooms.81 It specifically called the privacy interests “negligible.”82
Furthermore, in one case on public employee drug testing, the Court
noted several important limitations that added to the reasonableness of the
search by limiting its intrusiveness.83 Only employees tentatively accepted
for promotion for one of three specified categories of jobs were tested,
applicants knew in advance that drug tests were a requirement for promotion,
and, as in the student athlete case, there was no direct observation of the
urination and the test was for limited types of drugs.84 The Court even
remanded the case for further fact finding to determine whether the testing
program was overbroad, covering employees who would not likely gain
access to sensitive information and therefore should have been outside the
scope.85
The Court found intrusion to be minimal in several other non-drug
related cases as well. When the Court approved the warrantless investigation
of a police officer’s pager messages, it noted that the investigator had
redacted the contents of any message that the officer sent while off duty.86 In
78

See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665–66 (1989).
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997).
80
Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 38 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830–34 (2002)).
81
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995) (males observed from back,
females had private stall).
82
Id.
83
Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 489 U.S. at 672 n.2.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 678.
86
City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 762 (2010).
79
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several checkpoint cases it has found the intrusion permissible because it is
“slight.”87 In Lidster, it permitted stops because the “[c]ontact with the police
lasted only a few seconds” and it was “less likely to provoke anxiety or to
prove intrusive” given that the officers were seeking witnesses to a crime
rather than suspects.88
In contrast, courts have been more skeptical in cases where the intrusion
is severe. In the border search context, for instance, reasonable suspicion is
required for more invasive searches like body cavity and strip searches.89 But
reasonable suspicion is not required for even extensive searches of nonprivate physical objects. In one case, the Supreme Court upheld a border
search of a car’s gas tank—which required substantial dismantling—on the
grounds that it was not an especially private space when compared to a
passenger compartment.90
This is not to say that the Court has insisted on full intrusion
minimization. “This Court has ‘repeatedly refused to declare that only the
“least intrusive” search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.’”91 Such a rule could be expected to create great problems
“because ‘judges engaged in post hoc evaluations of government conduct can
almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of
the government might have been accomplished.’”92
Another major factor in these cases is the potential for arbitrary or
abusive enforcement. The Court is wary of “standardless and unconstrained
discretion” on the part of low-level government agents and prefers programs
in which “the discretion of the official in the field be circumscribed, at least
to some extent.”93 It is precisely to restrain such discretion that the warrant
process involves a disinterested magistrate, who can shield citizens from

87

See e.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451–52 (1990).
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 425, 427 (2004).
89
See Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (observing that strip and body
cavity searches generally require reasonable suspicion); United States v. Ramos-Saenz, 36
F.3d 59, 61 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that strip and body cavity searches at the border go
“beyond the routine”); United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287, 1292 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting
that strip and body cavity searches are intrusive and “non routine”).
90
See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154 (2004).
91
Quon, 560 U.S. at 763 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663
(1995)).
92
Id. (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 629 n.9 (1989)).
93
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979) (determining a checkpoint regime to be
unreasonable).
88
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potential abuse.94 When the Court upheld the regulatory search of a firearms
dealer, it specifically noted that “the possibilities of abuse and the threat to
privacy are not of impressive dimensions,” the scope of the inspection being
determined in part by a specific statute. 95 This concern with unfettered
discretion is in part what motivates Christopher Slobogin’s call for greater ex
ante legislative and administrative involvement in what he terms “panvasive”
surveillance.96 Given that the police are playing an effectively policy-making
role, he would ask that the police follow the usual rules of administrative
agencies when creating surveillance regimes.97
The Court also considers whether the enforcement regime is likely to
work. In a driver’s license checkpoint case, it was skeptical that the described
process would actually detect unlicensed drivers.98 It therefore concluded
that the spot checks were not “sufficiently productive to qualify as a
reasonable law enforcement practice under the Fourth Amendment” even
though the intrusion on individual drivers was “limited in magnitude.”99 The
Court does not, however, insist that a policy be optimal. The choice among
“reasonable alternatives remains with the” other branches of government.100
Finally, the Court has emphasized that it is fundamentally conducting a
balancing exercise. Though the cases speak of “compelling state interests,”
“the phrase describes an interest that appears important enough to justify the
particular search at hand, in light of other factors that show the search to be
relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy.”101 A less
intrusive search requires a more limited justification and a more intrusive
search a more extensive justification. “[T]he measures adopted . . . [must be]
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively
intrusive in light of” the objective.102
94
Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 532–33 (1967) (“This is precisely the discretion to
invade private property which we have consistently circumscribed by a requirement that a
disinterested party warrant the need to search.”).
95
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972) (upholding search and seizure in the
context of a pawnshop selling firearms).
96
Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 118–20
(2016).
97
Id. at 120–22.
98
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 660.
99
Id. at 660–61.
100
Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453–54 (1990).
101
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995); see also O’Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719–20 (1987) (“In the case of searches conducted by a public
employer, we must balance the invasion of the employees’ legitimate expectations of privacy
against the government’s need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the
workplace.”).
102
O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)).
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II. TWO EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF PANDEMIC SURVEILLANCE ATTITUDES
As shown in Part I, more intrusive searches require greater justification
and greater regulation. There are many ways to quantify the degree of
intrusion, but one approach is to simply ask people how much they object.
Do people, when confronted with the prospect of pandemic surveillance,
perceive government’s actions as highly intrusive?
Many scholars have advocated using public opinion data to inform the
Fourth Amendment analysis.103 Christopher Slobogin and Joseph
Schumacher pioneered this method by having respondents rate the
intrusiveness of a variety of law enforcement information gathering
techniques.104 Though they largely found respondents’ opinions typically
track judicial conclusions about whether the technique at issue constitutes a
“search” under the Fourth Amendment, scattered and important divergences
do arise.105 Similarly, work by Christine Scott-Hayward and colleagues and
Bernard Chao and colleagues has investigated Americans’ opinions and
beliefs about forms of electronic surveillance, finding, for example, that
people do generally expect privacy in data like their cell phone location
records.106
This method was used by Matthew Kugler in an analysis of border
searches of electronic devices.107 The government has extensive power to
conduct searches of people crossing the national border, including physical
packages of all sorts.108 It was very unclear at the time of the article whether
the extremely permissive border search doctrine would allow an unfettered

103
For an extensive discussion justifying the use of such data, see Kugler & Strahilevitz,
supra note 26, at 224–44.
104
See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 20, at 737–39; CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN,
PRIVACY AT RISK 111 (2007); see also Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Meera Adya & Jacqueline
Mogle, The Multiple Dimensions of Privacy: Testing Lay “Expectations of Privacy,” 11 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 331, 343–44 (2009) (replicating Slobogin and Schumacher’s main results in
a more representative sample).
105
See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 20, at 739–40, 738 tbl.1 (noting that the use
of a secretary as an undercover agent is deemed noticeably more intrusive by respondents than
the search of an office drawer).
106
Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Henry F. Fradella & Ryan G. Fischer, Does Privacy
Require Secrecy? Societal Expectations of Privacy in the Digital Age, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19,
45–58 (2015); Bernard Chao, Catherine Durso, Ian Farrell & Christopher Robertson, Why
Courts Fail to Protect Privacy: Race, Age, Bias, and Technology, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 263,
297–315 (2018).
107
Matthew B. Kugler, Comment, The Perceived Intrusiveness of Searching Electronic
Devices at the Border: An Empirical Study, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1165, 1166–67 (2014).
108
See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 150–52 (2004).
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examination of electronic devices as it did more traditional parcels.109 The
data from this study showed that people considered searches of the contents
of their electronic devices to be as intrusive as strip searches, and even more
likely than strip searches to reveal sensitive personal information.110 These
results supported greater regulation of such searches.
Matthew Kugler and Lior Strahilevitz have also shown that people’s
privacy expectations are relatively stable over time. Specifically, people’s
privacy expectations shifted only a small amount and only temporarily after
a major and well-publicized Supreme Court ruling extended privacy
protection to electronic devices in the context of an arrest.111
Extending this tradition of Fourth Amendment scholarship into the
pandemic surveillance context, two samples of American adults were
recruited by Dynata, an online survey firm with an established panel.112 The
demographics of the samples were set to match U.S. census proportions on
the dimensions of age, sex, region, education, and race/ethnicity. Full
demographics are reported in the Appendix. The first sample contained 1,178
individuals.113 Data were collected on April 9th, 10th, and 13th, 2020. On
those three days, a total of 6,188 American deaths were attributed to COVID19, for a total count of 28,140 for the pandemic to that point.114 Data for the
second sample of 1,197 were collected on June 18th, 19th, and 20th. On those

109
In the wake of Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 402–03 (2014) (creating an electronic
search exception to the search incident-to-arrest doctrine), it seems likely that there would be
an electronic device exception to the border search doctrine..
110
Kugler, supra note 107, at 1197 tbl.1A, 1198 tbl.1B, 1199.
111
See Matthew B. Kugler & Lior J. Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth Amendment
Circularity, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1747, 1780 (2017) (showing that privacy expectations in
electronic devices increased slightly one week after the ruling but had returned to baseline one
year later. Privacy expectations in physical searches—not covered by the ruling—did not
change).
112
About, DYNATA, https://www.dynata.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/RW7S-VTZS]
(last visited June 29, 2021).
113
For both samples, inattentive participants were screened in two ways. First,
participants who did not give the appropriate response to either of two attention check
questions—questions asking participants to give a particular response—were unable to
complete the study. Second, participants were screened from the final sample if they finished
the study in less than one-third of the time taken by the median participant or gave comments
on the final question indicating a lack of attention. The second sample also included a
CAPCHA question.
114
2,161, 2,290, and 1,737 respectively according to United States Coronavirus,
WORLDOMETER, https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/us/ [https://perma.cc/9
HZV-J854] (last visited July 28, 2021).
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three days, a total of 2,094 American deaths were attributed to COVID-19,
for a total of 125,443 from the pandemic to that point.115
These two samples were intended to capture two distinct moments in
the lifecycle of the pandemic. The first data collection occurred during the
height of the first peak.116 Individuals in Wave 1 reported being substantially
affected and concerned by COVID-19. Large majorities said they were
avoiding large gatherings (87.1%), mass transit and air travel (84.7%), small
gatherings (78.3%), and public places (77.2%). Most (64.9%) said they had
been following stay-at-home guidance for three or more weeks, going out
only for necessary errands like groceries or to work in an essential
industry.117 Though only 13.3% said they believed that they or a close friend
or family member had already been infected, many were either very (37.7%)
or somewhat (38.2%) worried that they or someone in their family would be
exposed to COVID-19.118 Notably, these questions about COVID-19
experiences followed, rather than preceded, the main study measures that are
described below.
Wave 2 data were collected well after the death toll had exceeded
100,000.119 Daily death rates had substantially fallen from the peak, states
had begun to reopen, and the infection rate had begun to rise again.120 The
members of this sample had ample opportunity to become familiar with
COVID-19. Somewhat fewer reported avoiding large gatherings (79.4%),
mass transit and air travel (75.9%), small gatherings (61.0%), and public
places (62.7%). Though more reported they or a close friend or family
member had been infected (18%), they were somewhat less likely to be very
(28.7%) or somewhat (41.7%) worried that they or a family member might
be exposed. Importantly, Wave 2 also occurred after the height of the Black
Lives Matter protests sparked by the death of George Floyd. This moment in
time was therefore also relevant to the law enforcement baseline measures as
those mass protests might affect views of regular police surveillance.
115
Id. 769, 747, 578, respectively. As the last day was a Saturday, the number of deaths
reported was lower for that day.
116
See WORLDOMETER, supra note 114, for a chart of deaths per day.
117
Eighteen and one half percent had been doing so for 2 weeks, 6.3% for one week, 4.1%
for less than a week, and 6.3% said they were not following stay-at-home guidance.
118
Seventeen and seven-tenths percent were not too worried and 6.5% were not worried
at all.
119
WORLDOMETER, supra note 114.
120
For a review of which restrictions were in place in which states at which times, see,
e.g., Lindsay K. Cloud, Katie Moran-McCabe, Elizabeth Platt & Nadya Prood, A
Chronological Overview of the Federal, State, and Local Response to COVID-19, in
ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19 10, 10–16 (Scott Burris, Sarah de Guia, Lance
Gable, Donna E. Levin, Wendy E. Parmet & Nicholas P. Terry eds., 2020).
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A. POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARD COVID-19 SURVEILLANCE

In each wave, participants were asked to report their attitudes about
surveillance conducted in one of three different domains: (1) law
enforcement officers collecting information for traditional crime-fighting
purposes, (2) law enforcement officers collecting information to ensure
compliance with COVID-19 stay-at-home orders, and (3) public health
officials (rather than law enforcement) collecting information to track
COVID-19 infections. This contrasted the two different kinds of COVID-19
surveillance generally contemplated with traditional law enforcement.
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of these three
scenarios/contexts, and the participant then had this context repeatedly
reinforced throughout. In the traditional police context, for example, the
overall instructions read:
The government collects information for a variety of purposes. For the questions on the
next pages, please think about police officers conducting investigations in the normal
course of their duties. Their goals in these investigations are the general prevention
and investigation of crimes. To fulfill these goals, they would be seeking information
about the locations and movements of both criminal suspects and victims.121

In contrast, the public health agent instructions read:
The government collects information for a variety of purposes. For the questions on the
next pages, please think about public health officials working on behalf of the
government to track the spread of a highly infectious disease, such as the coronavirus
disease, otherwise known as COVID19. Their goal in these investigations is the
promotion of public health. To fulfill this goal, they would be seeking information
about the locations and movements of people known to be infected and those with
whom they may have come into contact.

This difference was then further emphasized at the start of each search
vignette, “As part of a police investigation, an officer . . . ” versus “As part
of a public health investigation, a public health agent . . . ” and “To examine
compliance with stay-at-home orders, a police officer . . . .”
These three variants capture an important set of distinctions under
American law. As discussed in Part I, searches for traditional law
enforcement purposes are treated very differently than searches conducted
for non-law enforcement purposes. These vignettes contrast the traditional
law enforcement scenario with a “public health” variant, which has no
punitive purpose and does not involve traditional law enforcement in any
way, and a quarantine enforcement variant, which combines both traditional
law enforcement and public health monitoring.

121
These instructions were displayed for a minimum of 10 seconds before the participant
could advance to the next screen.
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The types of surveillance used here were inspired by those discussed
contemporaneously in relation to COVID-19. The heavy emphasis was on
the use of cell phone location data, either by law enforcement or public health
officials, to track movements and contacts. Participants were also asked
about the use of facial recognition technology in conjunction with public
surveillance cameras, smart meter data, drones, and credit card records.
These searches were presented on separate screens in random order.
For each surveillance method, participants were asked three questions.
First, they rated whether the search “violated a reasonable expectation of
privacy” on a scale ranging from Definitely Not (1) to Definitely Yes (5).
Then they rated the intrusiveness of the search on a sliding scale ranging from
0 – Not at all Intrusive to 100 – Extremely Intrusive.122 Finally, they were
asked whether the government official in question (police or public health
agent) should be legally allowed to look for information this way without a
warrant or court order (Yes or No).
This article presents the results of Wave 1 first. In that wave, results
across these three measures were extremely similar. This article uses average
intrusiveness, expectation of privacy, and warrant scores to allow for tests of
the overall effects. These tests show that traditional law enforcement
searches were viewed as less intrusive and less violative of expectations of
privacy than searches conducted for COVID-19 purposes, and participants
were less likely to prefer that a warrant or court order be required for these
traditional law enforcement purposes.123 The two pandemic conditions did
not significantly differ from each other.
Looking at the individual searches on the two continuous dependent
measures—the intrusiveness and expectation of privacy questions—shows
the consistency of this pattern.124 As can be seen in Figure 1, the overall effect
122

The reasonable expectation of privacy question is repeated from prior work by Kugler
and Strahilevitz, supra note 26 at 209–11. The intrusiveness question was first used by
Slobogin and Schumacher, supra note 20, at 736.
123
Intrusiveness: F(2, 1175) = 25.10, p < .001 η2 = .041. Law Enforcement (LE) (M =
59.06, SD = 25.42) was significantly lower than Public Health (PH) (M = 70.87, SD = 23.28),
and LE-Stay-at-Home (M = 68.35, SD = 24.63), which did not differ.
Expectation of privacy: F(2, 1175) = 37.94, p < .001 η2 = .061. LE (M = 3.20, SD = 1.03) was
significantly lower than PH (M = 3.77, SD = 0.96), and LE-Stay-at-Home (M = 3.70, SD =
1.03), which did not differ.
Warrant: F(2, 1175) = 7.31, p < .001 η2 = .012. LE (M = 0.62, SD = 0.34) was significantly
lower than PH (M = 0.69, SD = 0.34), and LE-Stay-at-Home (M = 0.71, SD = 0.32), which
did not differ.
124
ANOVAs and post hoc tests on these measures yielded identical results. F(2, 1175) >
4 for all omnibus tests. For all cases except the park and drone vignettes, Bonferroni-corrected
post hoc tests (p < .05) revealed that the law enforcement condition had significantly lower
mean scores than the other two, which did not differ significantly. For the park vignette, law
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of law enforcement searches being seen as significantly less intrusive holds
true for almost all of the search scenarios. Traditional law enforcement is
always lower than the other two conditions – public health and law
enforcement public health surveillance - and is significantly lower than both
for all searches except the drone scenarios. For the drone, traditional law
enforcement is still significantly lower than the public health condition but is
not significantly lower than the law enforcement stay-at-home order
condition.

enforcement was significantly lower than public health law enforcement, which in turn was
significantly lower than the general public health condition. For drone, law enforcement was
significantly lower than public health, but public health law enforcement did not differ
significantly from either.
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Figure 1: Perceived intrusiveness of searches in different contexts
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74.4

Cell phone location data from cell
company (month)

58.8
70.5
70.5
63.0

Cell phone records to determine who was
at a particular location at a particular time

71.6
72.2

Cell phone location data to trace whose
phones were near a certain person (day)

63.4
74.4
78.1

Credit card charges from credit card
company to track movements (month)
Use of facial recognition to match images
of people in public park to driver's license
database

60.7
59.5
67.0
50.1

Power usage data from utility to see if it is
consistent with person being at home
Drone recording video of people who are
outside
30.0
50.0
Police/Pandemic Stay-at-Home

70.8
69.2
59.1
59.4
64.7
58.2
70.0

90.0

Public Health/Pandemic Tracking
Police Investigation

Notes: Error bars depict 95% confidence intervals. 125 Responses range from 0 – Not
at all Intrusive to 100 – Extremely Intrusive. Table of means and standard deviations
is in the Appendix.

125
After the introductory phrase, which varied by condition (e.g., “As part of a police
investigation, an officer . . . ”), the questions read as follows:
. . . obtains from a cell phone company a record of a phone’s movements over the course of 4
weeks.
. . . obtains from a cell phone company a record of everyone whose phone was near a particular
place at a particular time.
. . . obtains from a cell phone company a record of everyone whose phone was near a particular
other person’s phone throughout a day, with the goal of determining with whom that person
may have come into contact.
. . . obtains from a credit card company a list of all charges made on a person’s credit card
over a month-long period, to determine where the user has been going and whom the user may
have been with.
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Table 1 shows that this same pattern was reflected on the expectation of
privacy measure. People consistently viewed pandemic surveillance as more
violative than traditional law enforcement surveillance. Comparing the
scores from the public health condition in this study to some past data, it
rapidly becomes clear that people are extremely concerned about pandemic
surveillance efforts by the state. Table 2 (in the next section) reprints some
data from a 2015 data collection by Kugler and Strahilevitz about law
enforcement surveillance.126 The top two searches from that dataset were
remotely turning on a person’s webcam (4.06 on a 5-point scale) and
obtaining their emails from their ISP (3.73). Only 2 of the 7 pandemic
surveillance searches in this study fell under those two top scores.

. . . uses facial recognition to identify people who were outside in a public park at a particular
time. The officer uses a program to compared images captured by a security camera in the
park to those in the state’s driver’s license database.
. . . obtains from a utility a house’s smart meter information, checking to see whether the
house’s electricity usage throughout the day is consistent with a person being at home.
. . . operates a drone with a camera attached to it to fly outside and video record anyone who
is out on the streets.
126
Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 26, at 252–55.
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Table 1: Whether searches violate reasonable expectations of privacy
Police
investigation
3.13a

Public
Health/
Pandemic
3.92b

Police/
Stay-athome
3.89b

(1.43)

(1.25)

(1.27)

Cell phone records of who was at a
particular location at a particular time

3.41a

3.77b

3.77b

(1.39)

(1.28)

(1.35)

Cell phone location data to trace whose
phones were near a certain person (day)

3.36a

3.81b

3.80b

(1.35)

(1.25)

(1.32)

Credit card charges from CC company
to track movements (month)

3.25a

4.09b

4.01b

(1.41)

(1.21)

(1.25)

Use facial recognition to match images
of people in public park

2.77a

3.60c

3.33b

(1.41)

(1.35)

(1.43)

Power usage data from utility to see if
consistent with person at home

3.28a

3.76b

3.75b

(1.44)

(1.30)

(1.38)

Drone recording video of people who
are outside

3.18a

3.48b

3.35ab

Cell phone location data tracking a
phone’s movements (month)

(1.41)
(1.47)
(1.42)
Notes: Means not sharing subscripts differ significantly at the p < .05 level. Numbers
in parentheses are standard deviations. Responses range from 1 – Definitely Not to
5 – Definitely Yes.

Despite this study being conducted during the peak of an international
pandemic, people were still resistant to these non-law enforcement searches,
and in fact were more resistant to them than the same searches being
conducted by law enforcement for ordinary crime prevention purposes.
When the study was repeated in mid-June—approximately 100,000
American COVID-19 deaths later—the results were basically identical.
Using the overall measures for the intrusiveness, expectation of privacy, and
warrant scores produced the same effect of search context, law enforcement
searches were seen as less intrusive, less violative of expectations of privacy,
and needed less court supervision.127 But there were no significant

127
Effects within Wave 2. Intrusiveness: F(2, 1194) = 42.32, p < .001 η 2 = .066. Law
Enforcement (LE) (M = 56.32, SD = 26.08) was significantly lower than Public Health (PH)
(M = 70.12, SD = 23.00), and LE-Stay-at-Home (M = 70.00, SD = 24.05), which did not
differ.
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differences between waves, and no interaction between wave and condition,
on either the overall scores or on any of the individual expectation of privacy
or intrusiveness measures.128 This means that views of both pandemic-related
searches and traditional law enforcement searches did not change despite the
events of the intervening two months. Full data on both expectations of
privacy and intrusiveness for this wave are presented in the Appendix.
In the second wave, participants were asked two follow-up questions
specifically about COVID-19 surveillance. For one, participants selected
from a list the statement or statements that best captured their views of
COVID-19 cell phone location surveillance.129 No single option attracted
majority support. The most commonly chosen alternative expressed concern
that the location data would be used for other things (48.2%), with many also
saying that they did not trust the government with the information (40.6%).
Only about a quarter (24.1%) said that they were concerned the information
would be shared with law enforcement, however, and only 20.0% cited cost
of such surveillance efforts as a concern. Participants also expressed some
skepticism about the efficacy of cell phone location surveillance. More
people said that cell phone tracking would not reduce the spread (34.5%) of
COVID-19 than said that it would (22.3%), and only 13.5% said that tracking
would help the country open faster.
The second question asked participants specifically about their views of
the efficacy of cell phone tracking for control of COVID-19.130 Only about a
quarter thought that the tracking would be “extremely” (10.6%) or “very”
Expectation of privacy: F(2, 1194) = 46.05, p < .001 η2 = .072. LE (M = 3.17, SD = 1.04) was
significantly lower than PH (M = 3.77, SD = 0.93), and LE-Stay-at-Home (M = 3.73, SD =
1.01), which did not differ.
Warrant: F(2, 1194) = 6.05, p = .002 η2 = .010. LE (M = 0.64, SD = 0.36) was significantly
lower than PH (M = 0.70, SD = 0.34), and LE-Stay-at-Home (M = 0.72, SD = 0.33), which
did not differ.
128
Intrusiveness. Wave effect: F(1, 2369) = 0.38. Interaction between wave and context:
F(2, 2369) = 1.62.
Expectation of privacy. Wave effect: F(1, 2369) = 0.00. Interaction between wave and context:
F(2, 2369) = 0.22.
Warrant. Wave effect: F(1, 2369) = 0.63. Interaction between wave and context: F(2, 2369) =
0.18.
129
This question was asked of all participants, and there were no differences based on
whether the participants had previously been rating law enforcement, public health, or law
enforcement stay-at-home order scenarios. The explanations were presented in random order.
In addition to the reported results, 3% also selected the “Other” option and included their own
explanation.
130
“Imagine the government tracked people using their cell phone location information to
help limit the spread of COVID-19. How effective do you believe this tracking would be at
controlling the virus?” Responses ranged from 1 – Not at all effective to 5 – Extremely
effective. This question was also asked of all participants.
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(12.4%) effective, with a further third (32.0%) saying that it would be
“moderately” effective. Many expressed skepticism, saying that tracking
would be only “slightly effective” (19.3%) or “not effective at all” (25.7%).
B. COMPARISON OF LAW ENFORCEMENT SEARCH ATTITUDES
OVER TIME

A recurrent question in this domain is whether the surveillance attitudes
that we observe are stable over time. The data in the previous section
documents an impressive amount of stability in attitudes over the span of
three extremely tumultuous months—recall that participants experienced
both the rising COVID-19 death toll and the mass protests of early June
before Wave 2 of the survey. But there is a valid concern that the mere
beginning of the pandemic also had some effect on attitudes, and that this
occurred before Wave 1 of the present project. One could imagine, for
instance, the beginning of a pandemic might depress privacy concerns across
the board. This would be consistent with psychological work showing that
feelings of threat and thoughts of death cause meaningful changes in political
attitudes and beliefs.131
Though there are no prior data on public health surveillance that would
permit a direct comparison with the present results, data collected by Kugler
and Strahilevitz in May and June 2015 allows for a comparison on several
law enforcement measures.132 In Wave 1 of the present survey, these law
enforcement questions were asked after the ones presented in the prior
section and employed the 5-point reasonable expectations of privacy scale
described above.
As can be seen in Table 2, it is not the case that privacy expectations
have generally declined. In the 5 years from 2015 to 2020, expectations of
privacy were mostly constant. The sum of the differences across the 10 search
types included in this comparison is 0.10 on a 5-point scale, for an average
change of 0.01. Expectations increased significantly for use of public

131

See, e.g., Brian L. Burke, Andy Martens & Erik H. Faucher, Two Decades of Terror
Management Theory: A Meta-Analysis of Mortality Salience Research, 14 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH. REV. 155, 185–87 (2010).
132
Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 26, at 257, 260. For the 2015 data, N was 716 for the
non-GPS questions and 362 for the GPS questions. The April 2020 data contain only those
participants who were initially in the law enforcement condition in the first wave, N = 389.
Those participants in the other two conditions had higher privacy expectations on some
measures—consistent with their prior responses—and potentially presented a misleading
picture of change over time on law enforcement expectations. These questions were omitted
in the second wave to create room for the Black Lives Matter (BLM) items and supplemental
questions on COVID-19.
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cameras and facial recognition and barely changed on other measures.133
Though it is obviously possible that there was a change in privacy
expectations prior to COVID-19 and that COVID-19 had the effect of
negating that change, it seems far more likely that expectations have instead
remained constant during this time and that the emergence of the COVID-19
health crisis therefore had no noticeable effect.
Table 2 – Expectations of privacy against law enforcement searches by year
May-June,
2015

April,
2020

Remote activate webcam

4.06

(1.37)

3.90

(1.44)

-0.16

Obtain Emails From ISP

3.73

(1.40)

3.64

(1.39)

-0.09

Facial recognition at Super
Bowl
Camera in public park

2.61

(1.54)

2.87

(1.44)

0.26

*

2.40

(1.55)

2.65

(1.51)

0.25

*

Cell-site data

3.26

(1.50)

3.32

(1.33)

0.06

Stingray cell-phone tracking

3.42

(1.42)

3.53

(1.38)

0.11

GPS-Locate

3.44

(1.50)

3.42

(1.36)

-0.01

GPS-Track 1 day

3.55

(1.52)

3.48

(1.38)

-0.07

GPS-Track 1 week

3.67

(1.46)

3.55

(1.35)

-0.12

GPS-Track 1 month

3.73

(1.46)

3.61

(1.37)

-0.13

Difference

Notes: Higher numbers indicate greater expectations of privacy on a 1–5 scale.
Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. ** indicates differences that are
significant at the p < .01 level, * at p < .05. The questions appeared in random order
except the GPS searches, which were last.134

133

Given that there are 10 searches here, we performed a Bonferroni correction for
multiple comparisons. Without that correction, the webcam difference would have been
significant at the .05 level.
134
Participants were asked, “Would it violate people’s reasonable expectations of privacy
if law enforcement . . .
. . . used remote activation software to turn on the webcam on their laptop without their
permission?
. . . obtained from their internet service provider copies of emails exchanged between them
and someone else?
. . . used facial recognition software to check whether any of the fans entering the Super Bowl
stadium match images in a Department of Homeland Security database?
. . . installed a video camera to watch a public park where criminal activity has recently
occurred?
. . . obtained from their cell-phone company stored information about whether their cell phone
was near a particular location on a particular day?
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In addition to showing that COVID-19 has not had a strong general
effect on privacy attitudes, these results also help counter one criticism
sometimes aimed at this type of work: that attitudes are too unstable to be the
basis of legal doctrine. Over a five-year period, where much happened,
expectations were stable. And expectations were again stable during the
COVID-19 pandemic itself, as demonstrated in Section II.A, even as the
social situation evolved, and a string of anti-law enforcement protests swept
the entire country. This suggests that survey results in this area from one year
will most likely carry over to the next.
C. UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE
ATTITUDES

Pandemic surveillance worries different people than law enforcement
surveillance. Intuitively, this should not be surprising. Though some people
are opposed to “government” surveillance in general, not all types of
government monitoring are concerning in the same ways. And these results
show different ideological beliefs correlate with surveillance concerns in
each context.
Prior work has observed that attitudes about law enforcement searches
are correlated with the psychological construct known as rightwing
authoritarianism.135 The social psychological theory of authoritarianism
defines authoritarians as people who are especially willing to submit to
authority, who believe that it is particularly important to yield to traditional
conventions and norms, and who are hostile and punitive toward those who
question authority or who violate such conventions and norms.136 The
specific authoritarianism scale used in prior work, and again employed here,
is the Authoritarian Submission scale. This scale is intended to measure the

. . . used a fake cell tower to trick their phone into giving the police more accurate information
about where the phone is?
. . . used a car’s onboard GPS system to locate it on public streets at a single moment in time
without the owner’s permission?
. . . used a car’s onboard GPS system to track its movements on public streets for one day
without the owner’s permission?
Same, but for one week?
Same, but for one month?”
135
Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 26, at 252–55.
136
See Bob Altemeyer, The Other “Authoritarian Personality,” in 30 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 47 (Mark Zanna ed., 1998).
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first of those impulses: the extent to which people believe that authority
should be respected and obeyed rather than challenged and questioned.137
As can be seen in Table 3, attitudes about traditional law enforcement
surveillance again correlated with authoritarianism on each of our three
composite measures. Those scoring higher in authoritarianism perceived law
enforcement searches to be less intrusive and less a violation of expectations
of privacy and were less likely to want to require a warrant or court order to
conduct them. Yet this effect was significantly weaker on each of the three
measures in the public health agent condition, where authoritarianism did not
predict any of them significantly. The law enforcement pandemic
surveillance condition was intermediate between the other two conditions.
Similar patterns were found on two questions that were added in the second
survey wave, one on trust in police and one on support for the then-recent
Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests. Higher trust in the police was correlated
with viewing the searches as less intrusive and less a violation of expectations
of privacy—and support for BLM with viewing them as more intrusive and
more a violation—in the law enforcement condition, but not the public health
condition. The pattern on the BLM question actually reversed in the public
health condition; those who supported the protests more thought public
health searches were slightly less intrusive.
Support for public health monitoring was correlated with different
constructs. Trust in the police was irrelevant, and trust in public health
officials was now relevant. Further, in the public health and law enforcement
public health conditions, the specific belief that cell phone tracking would be
effective in limiting the spread of COVID-19 was associated with viewing
all searches as less intrusive and less a violation of expectations of privacy.
Probing deeper reveals an interesting pattern among these attitudinal
measures. Trust in the police and trust in public health officials were
themselves moderately related.138 Nevertheless, authoritarianism correlated

137

We measured this construct at the close of the survey section asking about COVID-19
surveillance. Scale items include “It’s great that many young people today are prepared to
defy authority” (reverse coded), and “What our country needs most is discipline, with
everyone following our leaders in unity.” The response scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree)
to 6 (strongly agree). Higher scores indicate stronger endorsement of authoritarian ideologies.
John Duckitt, Boris Bizumic, Stephen W. Krauss & Edna Heled, A Tripartite Approach to
Right-Wing Authoritarianism: The Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism Model, 31
POL. PSYCH. 685, 690 (2010) (“Thus, the ‘authoritarian submission’ dimension can be defined
as expressing attitudes favouring uncritical, respectful, obedient, submissive support for
existing societal or group authorities and institutions (protrait) versus critical, questioning,
rebellious, oppositional attitudes to them (contrait).”).
138
r(1196) = 0.438, p < .001.
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strongly with trust in police, but not trust in public health officials.139
Authoritarianism also negatively predicted support for the BLM protests.140
This suggests that there is a general pro- (or con-) police sentiment that does
not generally translate to views of government surveillance outside the
traditional law enforcement context.

139
Authoritarianism correlated with trust in police r(1191) = 0.432, p < .001 but not trust
in public health officials r(1191) = 0.051, ns.
140
r(1186) = -0.464, p < .001. Trust in the police is, unsurprisingly, also related negatively
to support for the BLM protests r(1192) = -0.323, p < .001. Trust in public health officials is
slightly positively related to BLM support, however. r(1191) = 0.095, p < .001.
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Table 3: Correlations with attitudinal measures
Traditional Law Enforcement
Authoritarianism
Trust in Police
Support for BLM

Intrusiveness
-.263 ***

Expectation of
Privacy
-.262 ***

Warrant
-.195 **

-.266 ***

-.231 ***

-.344 **

.200 ***

.166 ***

.036

Trust in Public Health Officials

-.079

-.060

-.172 **

Perceived Effectiveness COVID Cell
Tracking
Worried Family Exposed to COVID

-.063

-.079

-.344 **

Public Health
Authoritarianism
Trust in Police

.082 *

Intrusiveness
-.039

.058
Expectation of
Privacy
-.036

-.014

Warrant
-.027

.000

-.001

-.085

Support for BLM

-.125 *

-.065

-.183 **

Trust in Public Health Officials

-.163 ***

-.177 ***

-.264 **

Perceived Effectiveness COVID Cell
Tracking
Worried Family Exposed to COVID

-.336 ***

-.360 ***

-.462 **

-.025

-.034

-.095 *

Law Enforcement - Stay-at-home
Authoritarianism
Trust in Police
Support for BLM

Intrusiveness
-.098 **
-.109 *

Expectation of
Privacy
-.112 ***

Warrant
-.125 **

-.137 ***

-.302 **

.038

.040

.031

Trust in Public Health Officials

-.070

-.098

-.242 **

Perceived Effectiveness COVID Cell
Tracking
Worried Family Exposed to COVID

-.273 ***

-.375 ***

-.455 **

-.035

-.042

.123 **

On one level, it is not surprising that public health monitoring should
tap different psychological constructs than does law enforcement monitoring.
But these patterns reflect the importance that people are placing on the
government’s motivation behind the search. Not only are people more
accepting of some but not other government programs on average, but
different people are more accepting depending on the purpose. As such,
universal agreement on what types of government monitoring during a
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pandemic are “reasonable” is unlikely. Nevertheless, universal agreement or
not, courts will need to grapple with this question.
III. MAKING PANDEMIC SURVEILLANCE REASONABLE
Prior to these studies, not much was known about how the public viewed
pandemic surveillance. In this Part, we apply our empirical results from Part
II to the question of how best to think about pandemic searches from a legal
standpoint. We then comment on the types of limitations and procedures that
would make pandemic public health surveillance, especially cell phone
location surveillance, more constitutionally reasonable.
A. HOW INTRUSIVE ARE PANDEMIC SEARCHES?

Central to the reasonableness balancing analysis is the intrusiveness of
the proposed search. Courts have stressed that the proposed intrusion on
privacy is “slight,” “negligible,” and lasting “only a few seconds,” when
approving searches while expressing great skepticism about searches that are
overbroad or highly intrusive.141 The data presented in Part II show that
people feel the intrusiveness of many of these surveillance techniques quite
acutely. In the law enforcement condition, more people felt that use of
historical cell-site data violated their expectations of privacy (43.5%) than
did not (31.9%).142 The same for tower dumps (48% yes, 26.2% no) and cell
contact tracing (47% yes, 26.2% no). This is, in fact, perfectly consistent with
the high value Chief Justice Roberts has told us should be placed on cell
phone location information.143 But importantly this study tells us that people
feel the invasion more acutely in the pandemic context. Those same
proportions are exaggerated in the public health surveillance condition. For
location history, 66.0% yes and 15.2% no. For tower dumps 59.1% yes,
17.9% no. For contact tracing 62.2% yes, 16.0% no.144 This is not a small
shift.
The central message of these results is that people find pandemic
surveillance, either conducted by public health authorities or by police to
enforce quarantine orders, to be more intrusive than traditional law
141

See supra notes 82–90.
Contrasting those who picked one of the two choices below the midpoint with those
who picked one of the two choices above the midpoint on the reasonable expectation of
privacy question. This analysis combines the data from Waves 1 and 2, for a total N of 2375.
143
See supra notes 28–33.
144
The numbers are approximately the same for the law enforcement stay-at-home
enforcement condition. Location history: 15.0% no, 65.3% yes. Tower dump: 18.0%, no
59.8% yes. Contact tracing: 15.8%, no 63.2% yes. Full results are given in Table 5A in the
Appendix.
142
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enforcement surveillance. There are many potential reasons for these results.
For one, there is a novelty factor at play. Whether one is pro-police or not,
everyone knows who they are and understands what they do when they are
engaged in traditional crime control. In contrast, the idea of public health
officials suddenly tracking people, or police enforcing new and pervasive
stay-at-home orders not related to traditional crime control efforts, is new to
most people.
For another, the pandemic monitoring scenarios may imply a more
universal form of surveillance than traditional law enforcement. Most often
people think of traditional crime-fighting as directed at people other than
themselves.145 But when it comes to pandemic surveillance, everyone is a fair
target. Prior work by several researchers has shown that privacy violations
loom larger when they are directed at the self.146
On the question of universal surveillance, it is helpful to step back from
the survey results and consider the one prior government program that looks
like the kind of universal surveillance proposed here: the National Security
Agency’s phone-metadata program.147 As with pandemic surveillance, this
program collected personal information from almost the entire population.
The NSA metadata program was conceived in the wake of the September
11th attacks and ran in one form or another until the 2015 passage of the USA
FREEDOM Act fundamentally transformed it by imposing new
restrictions.148 Under the first instantiation of this program, the NSA appears
to have been collecting the call records from every major telecom provider
on a daily basis—effectively the call records of every American.149 Though
it did not collect the contents of those calls, it did know the numbers dialed
and the call times and durations.150 The intended use for this data was to look
for patterns of calls between identified terrorism suspects and their unknown
confederates.151
145

See, e.g., Susan J. Stabile, Othering and the Law, 12 U. ST. THOMAS L.J., 381, 395–96

(2016).
146

See, e.g., Chao, Durso, Farrell & Robertson, supra note 106, at 288, 299; Slobogin &
Schumacher, supra note 20, at 759–60; Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 26, at 248 n.170.
147
See generally Charlie Savage, Disputed N.S.A. Phone Program Is Shut Down, Aide
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/04/us/politics/nsa-phone
-records-program-shut-down.html [https://perma.cc/C68D-CU7Q].
148
Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d 559, 561 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (describing the program and
remanding to the district court to assess whether the litigation was moot following the passage
of the USA FREEDOM Act).
149
Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1, 7–8, 39 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated, 800 F.3d
559 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
150
Id. at 15–17.
151
Id. at 15.
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The NSA program attracted two conflicting judicial opinions on the
issue of universal targeting. In one of these, In re Application of the FBI, the
court ruled that the program was constitutionally permissible.152 Broadly
speaking, Judge Claire Eagan held that the collection of metadata was not
generally a Fourth Amendment search, and that the aggregation of many
actions, none of which were independently Fourth Amendment searches, did
not suddenly create a Fourth Amendment search.153
Judge Richard Leon came to the opposite conclusion in Klayman v.
Obama.154 Relying on the concurrences in Jones that spoke about the
importance of search duration, Leon concluded that aggregation did
matter.155 This mass surveillance was “almost-Orwellian” and not like
anything that could have been “conceived” at the time of the 1979 Smith case,
which held that metadata collection was not a search.156 Simply put, the
quantity mattered.157
Pandemic surveillance employing cellular location history is more
intrusive than surveillance employing call history. In Carpenter, the Supreme
Court has told us that cell phones are special, that they are necessities of
modern life, and that even well-established Supreme Court doctrines must
fall rather than be used to extinguish cell phone location privacy.158 So, there

152

In re Application of the FBI for an Ord. Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things from
[Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *1 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).
153
Id. at *2 (“Put another way, where one individual does not have a Fourth Amendment
interest, grouping together a large number of similarly-situated individuals cannot result in a
Fourth Amendment interest springing into existence ex nihilo.”).
154
See 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015), mooted
by statute, USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268. During the
litigation, many judges expressed views of the merits. Now-Supreme Court Justice Brett
Kavanaugh, for instance, agreed with the District Court in In re Application of the FBI. In a
concurring opinion later in the Klayman litigation, he explained that he believed that the
metadata program was constitutionally reasonable either because the collection of metadata
was not a search under Smith, or because it was a reasonable special needs search. Klayman
v. Obama, 805 F.3d 1148, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in a denial of
rehearing en banc). But the shifting policies underlying the program prevented clear precedent
on the pre-FREEDOM Act version.
155
See Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 31–32 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400,
415–16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Jones, 565 U.S. at 429–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
156
Klayman, 957 F.Supp 2d at 33. (The pen register in Smith “in no way resembles the
daily, all-encompassing, indiscriminate dump of phone metadata that the NSA now receives
as part of its Bulk Telephony Metadata Program. It’s one thing to say that people expect phone
companies to occasionally provide information to law enforcement; it is quite another to
suggest that our citizens expect all phone companies to operate what is effectively a joint
intelligence-gathering operation with the Government.”).
157
See id. at 35–36.
158
See supra notes 28–34.
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is a clear Fourth Amendment interest at stake in pandemic surveillance,
which relies heavily on cell phone contact tracing, even before turning to the
issues of universal targeting.
The question for pandemic surveillance is whether the scale of the
surveillance makes the existing Fourth Amendment problem exponentially
worse. And, on that point, the argument presented in Klayman has
strengthened over the years. In Riley, Chief Justice Roberts granted extra
protection to electronic devices because there was “a quantitative and a
qualitative” difference between them and the physical objects described in
previous cases such as wallets and address books.159 As in Klayman, quantity
mattered.160
B. MAKING PANDEMIC SURVEILLANCE REASONABLE

That pandemic surveillance is seen as so intrusive and uses universal
targeting counts against its reasonableness as a constitutional matter. This
section begins by discussing the utility of pandemic surveillance and
concludes by recommending safeguards that would make it reasonable.
As the COVID-19 pandemic progressed, countries took different
approaches to contact tracing. Foreign governments in China, Taiwan, and
elsewhere began using smartphone applications to do digital contact
tracing.161 In Asia, and, for a time, Israel, the approach to contact tracing was
centralized and mandatory, while in much of Europe, countries favored a decentralized approach premised on voluntary opting-in.162 The centralized
Israeli system was run through the domestic security agency.163 When
provided with the cellular number of an infected person, the agency was able
to run that target number through its database of cellular information—
message metadata, location information, tower connections—to seek out
anyone who may have been within six feet of the target person for more than
fifteen minutes within the preceding two weeks.164 There was no enrollment

159

Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 391–93 (2014).
Id.
161
I. Glenn Cohen, Lawrence O. Gostin & Daniel J. Weitzner, Digital Smartphone
Tracking for COVID-19: Public Health and Civil Liberties in Tension, 323 J. AM. MED.
ASSOC. 2371, 2371–72 (2020).
162
Id.
163
Tehilla Shwartz Altshuler & Rachel Aridor Hershkowitz, How Israel’s COVID-19
Mass Surveillance Operation Works, BROOKINGS (July 6, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/
techstream/how-israels-covid-19-mass-surveillance-operation-works/ [https://perma.cc/BM8
N-EN88].
164
Id.
160
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process; the government collected the information directly from various
providers.165
The Apple and Google framework underlying the European systems, by
contrast, allows people to install apps that cause each person’s phone to
broadcast an anonymized ID over Bluetooth.166 This allows for other phones
carrying the apps to record these IDs, creating a local record of contacts.
When a person reports to the app that they have been diagnosed with COVID19, the app allows a centralized server—which does not know who matches
with what ID—to flag that person’s ID, letting everyone else’s app check
whether that ID matches one of their contacts.167 One substantial problem
with this approach is persuading people to even install the application; uptake
was fairly low in most countries.168 In contrast with both these approaches,
the United States has generally relied on manual contact tracing, the same
technique used for prior diseases such as tuberculosis and HIV, with only
scattered attempts to use decentralized digital technologies.169
Even with over 600,000 COVID-19-related deaths in the U.S.,170 the list
of unanswered questions about the disease remains long. It is still not clear
how well digital contact tracing works.171 At the beginning of a pandemic,
when digital contact tracing might be most useful as the number of cases will
be low,172 less will be known. The case of Israel is a useful example on this
point. At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the country’s domestic
intelligence agency was coordinating digital contact tracing with the aid of
counterterrorism technology.173 In retrospect, there are concerns regarding

165

Id.
See Kissick, Setzer & Schulz, supra note 5; Andy Greenberg, How Apple and Google
Are Enabling Covid-19 Contact-Tracing, WIRED (Apr. 10, 2020, 3:37 PM), https://www.wire
d.com/story/apple-google-bluetooth-contact-tracing-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/ER3P-3FX
5].
167
See Greenberg, supra note 166.
168
See, e.g., Kissick, Setzer & Schulz, supra note 5.
169
See Kissick, Setzer & Schulz, supra note 5; Cohen, Gostin & Weitzner, supra note
161.
170
Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nyti
mes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-cases.html [https://perma.cc/YR99-P76E] (last
visited July 28, 2021).
171
See, e.g., Kissick, Setzer & Schulz, supra note 5.
172
See Evan Anderson & Scott Burris, Is Law Working? A Brief Look at the Legal
Epidemiology of COVID-19, in ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19 20, 23 (Scott
Burris, Sarah de Guia, Lance Gable, Donna E. Levin, Wendy E. Parmet & Nicholas P. Terry
eds., 2020) (describing how early adoption of risk mitigation measures has substantial effect).
173
Daniel Estrin, Israel’s Government Wants Spy Agency to Resume COVID-19 Tracing.
Spy Chief Objects, NPR (June 24, 2020, 1:17 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus166
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the program’s effectiveness: Israel’s digital contact tracing technology
identified less than 30% of positive COVID-19 cases, which could be due to
the fact that “the technology is less effective at tracking subjects indoors.”174
But they did not know that then, and could not have. And time matters. Speed
was a key factor in favor of South Korea’s ability to contain the spread of
COVID-19, for example.175 How then should courts weigh immediate state
needs against privacy risks given that information will often be lacking?
Initially, courts will largely have to defer to government experts on the
question of whether the program will work. But the effectiveness of a
surveillance program—the social value of allowing it—is only one side of
the balancing test. The other side is the privacy cost, and that is much easier
to assess, and limit, ex ante. That is why safeguards are so critical in this
domain.
Many safeguards can be built ex ante, and they can be constantly refined
as more information becomes available. We therefore believe that the
reasonableness of a pandemic surveillance program is more a function of the
safeguards it employs than any other factor. With this in mind, we propose
the following restrictions for any government-led cell phone location
surveillance programs during a public health emergency:
 Clearly identify who will have access to what data.
 Restrict law enforcement’s access to cell location data for the
purposes of criminal investigations.
 Restrict researchers’ access to cell location data to only highly limited
and narrow uses since location data is nearly impossible to fully
anonymize.176
 Implement and enforce a staggered deletion system for cell location
data, whereby health officials would be required to delete all
identifiable data except for data corresponding to the most recent
month.
 Engage in a continual review process assessing the necessity of the
program. Since it is unlikely that a disease, such as COVID-19, will
live-updates/2020/06/24/882741912/israels-government-wants-spy-agency-to-resume-covid19-tracing-spy-chief-objects [https://perma.cc/T4HR-EFDL].
174
Id.
175
See Coronavirus: Fauci Warns of 100,000 US Cases Per Day, BBC (June 30, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53237824 [https://perma.cc/9WLB-SUQW].
176
See, e.g., Stuart A. Thompson & Charlie Warzel, Twelve Million Phones, One Dataset,
Zero Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/19/
opinion/location-tracking-cell-phone.html [https://perma.cc/Q35E-9FZB] (using anonymous
location data to track and identify a Microsoft employee as he interviewed with and then
started at a job Amazon). The fundamental problem is that very few people sleep in your house
and work at your job.
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ever fully be eradicated, government should have a clear goal, based
on updated models as data becomes available, for when a digital
surveillance system should be discontinued.
 Establish an audit system that ensures all data is deleted after it has
been determined that the pandemic crisis has passed.
Efforts to implement privacy safeguards for large-scale public data
collection are not new. Such programs often have sizable benefits, but also
real privacy costs. For example, household energy usage data can be
extremely useful for utilities for providing more efficient and cost-saving
services, as well for consumers to engage in more climate-friendly
behaviors.177 Without proper safeguards, however, such data could easily be
misused at the expense of one’s right to privacy in the home.178 As private
tech companies such as Google and Apple have sought to enter the digital
contact tracing game during COVID-19, they have built privacy protections
into their applications, including opt-in and anonymization features, from the
get-go.179
Fears of underregulated pandemic surveillance have already played out
overseas. While South Korea has been hailed for its success in quickly
containing the spread of the COVID-19 virus, in part due to the use of contact
tracing technology, the country’s government is facing criticism for what
some see as a failure to protect individual privacy. Despite what the public
had been told, it recently came to light that South Korea has been keeping
patient information from a 2015 coronavirus outbreak, prompting concerns
that it will not delete COVID-19 patient information as promised.180
The U.S. response to contact tracing, digital or otherwise, has been
uncoordinated and ineffective. As of the summer of 2020, there is no federal
approach to contact tracing, and state efforts have had mixed results.181 On
the analog-tracing side, response rates have been low. In New York City,
which at the onset of the COVID-19 outbreak had one of the highest infection
rates, the city’s contact tracing response rate has been a mere 35% when it
needed to be at least 75%.182 Other states similarly using phone calls and
177

See Kugler & Hurley, supra note 20, at 460–69.
Id. at 453–54.
179
See Cohen, Gostin & Weitzner, supra note 161, at 2371.
180
Anthony Kuhn, South Korea Holds onto Patient Data from Prior Coronavirus,
Worrying Privacy Groups, NPR (June 30, 2020, 11:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/c
oronavirus-live-updates/2020/06/30/884580723/south-korea-holds-onto-patient-data-from-pr
ior-coronavirus-worrying-privacy-grou [https://perma.cc/YF3Y-Y2NN].
181
See Cohen, Gostin & Weitzner, supra note 161, at 2372.
182
Sharon Otterman, N.Y.C. Hired 3,000 Workers for Contact Tracing. It’s Off to a Slow
Start, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/21/nyregion/nyc-conta
ct-tracing.html [https://perma.cc/5T9K-FGFN].
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survey questions for contact tracing—such as Massachusetts and
Louisiana—have also had low response rates.183
And digital contact tracing, used by some states like North and South
Dakota, has already led to real privacy problems.184 Although the application
maker had promised to make user information, including location data,
private except to the states’ Department of Health, in fact it shared some of
that data with an outside marketing company.185 In a small county in Texas,
a government official improperly disclosed the names and addresses of
COVID-positive patients with emergency personnel via text rather than
through a secure, encrypted email, as required by local health officials.186
Adding to these Texas residents’ privacy concerns, even though lists with
contact information for COVID-19 patients are in theory not supposed to be
disseminated to an entire emergency department, such as police, in practice,
they often are.187
The anti-COVID-19 lockdown and pro-BLM protests in May and June
of 2020 further highlight the dangers of pandemic surveillance. State officials
could easily use surveillance programs, particularly those designed to enforce
stay-at-home orders, as pretext for tracing an individual’s movements and
activities beyond the scope of what is warranted in a health crisis. This could
easily impinge on freedom of association.188 Our proposal that law
enforcement be barred from using pandemic surveillance data for traditional
law enforcement purposes would help mitigate fears that health surveillance
data would be repurposed by police to target those engaged in political
protesting.
Similar restrictions on law enforcement use have previously
accompanied some government data collection efforts. The Seventh Circuit,
for example, recently found the installation of intrusive smart meters by a
public utility reasonable in part because the statute required law enforcement
183

Id.
Geoffrey A. Fowler, One of the First Contact-Tracing Apps Violates Its Own Privacy
Policy, WASH. POST (May 21, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/05/2
1/care19-dakota-privacy-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/DZ47-X7X8].
185
Id.
186
Telephone Interview with public health official in Texas (July 23, 2020) (on file with
the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology).
187
Id.
188
See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–66 (1958)
(discussing how disclosure of an organization’s membership list impinges on freedom of
association); see also Ana Pajar Blinder, Don’t (Tower) Dump on Freedom of Association:
Protest Surveillance under the First and Fourth Amendments, 112 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
125, 128-30, 133-137 (2021) (discussing how even the limited collection of location data can
reveal politically meaningful associations and potentially chill freedom of expression).
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to get a warrant to access the data.189 The New Jersey Supreme Court’s
approval of nonconsensual HIV testing for certain sex offenders was likewise
in part because the results of the test would not be shared with law
enforcement.190
The safeguards we propose would have the effect of ensuring that any
surveillance systems will incorporate privacy concerns into their design from
the outset, before deployment. Our suggestions are consistent with the
regulations approved in the existing case law on special needs searches and
the related domain of constitutional protection for information privacy. On
the Fourth Amendment front, consider Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v.
City of Naperville.191 In that case, the Seventh Circuit considered whether the
city’s installation of electricity smart meters, and the subsequent relaying of
utility information, amounted to an unreasonably invasive government
search.192 In finding that the collection of home utility data was reasonable,
the court emphasized that, despite the substantial privacy intrusion into the
home, the data collection was tailored to the limited, non-law enforcement
purpose identified by the government and could not be shared or repurposed
in a manner inconsistent with that purpose.193
The Supreme Court also considered safeguards to be highly important
in the constitutional information privacy case Whalen v. Roe.194 As one of the
few Supreme Court cases that directly addresses health information privacy
concerns, Whalen is key for considering constitutional safeguards. Whalen
came at a time when the government was concerned with a different type of
public health crisis: growing prescription drug abuse.195 At issue was whether
the prescription reporting requirement of a New York statute aimed at
curbing illicit drug use was unreasonably intrusive.196 The Court did not
believe the program posed a sufficiently grievous threat to constitutional
privacy interests where the state interest—“to minimize the misuse of
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Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 528 (7th Cir.
2018) (“And Naperville’s amended ‘Smart Grid Customer Bill of Rights’ clarifies that the
city’s public utility will not provide customer data to third parties, including law enforcement,
without a warrant or court order.”).
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In re J.G., 701 A.2d 1260, 1262, 1266–67 (1997) (results would be shared with the
complaining victim and victim support services but could not be used for prosecution or shared
with the prosecutor’s office).
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900 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2018).
192
Id. at 528.
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Id. at 528–29.
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429 U.S. 589 at 593–95 (1977).
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See id. at 591–92.
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Id. at 591–96.

950

KUGLER & OLIVER

[Vol. 111

dangerous drugs”197—was great and the state had shown a good-faith effort
to protect individual information.198 In addressing patient concerns about
misuse of the data, such as by law enforcement officials, the Court noted the
extensive security provisions taken to guard patient data, including: strict
limits on who had access to patient files,199 a statutory requirement that
patient records be destroyed after five years, a “locked wire fence”
surrounding the room where the vault with the records was kept, an alarm
system, use of a locked cabinet to guard the computer tapes, and the “offline” feature used to run the computer files.200 In addition to these extensive
safeguards, the Court noted there was little reason to believe the information
would be misused: the New York statute governing this information
collection system included a nondisclosure provision which made “[w]illful
violation . . . a crime punishable by up to one year in prison and a $2,000
fine,”201 making it unlikely, by the Court’s reasoning, that such a provision
would be violated.202
What does this mean for states attempting to collect individual health
information during the COVID-19 crisis? Whalen shows how the
incorporation of robust privacy safeguards can justifiably lead to judicial
deference to government officials during a public health crisis. Despite the
drug crisis of the 1970s, the Court did not give the government free rein to
do with patient information as it pleased, but instead looked to whether and
how the government was protecting patient privacy.203 First, the Court was
able to pinpoint evidence of existing privacy safeguards, including internal
controls as well as external restrictions in the form of statutory sanctions. 204
In the COVID-19 context, many states have undertaken contact tracing even
as legislation about safeguards failed to advance at the federal level.205
Second, the state interest in Whalen was curbing prescriptions for drugs with
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a high potential for abuse, which targets only those in the population who
take such drugs.206 Contact tracing programs target the entire population.207
Although the Whalen Court approved of the New York program, it
emphasized that its opinion did not reach any questions related to unlawful
disclosure of private information or to data collection by systems “that did
not contain comparable security provisions.”208 This should be taken as a
warning note for those interested in pandemic surveillance. A digital contact
tracing program could easily be constitutional, given appropriate safeguards.
Without such safeguards, the extreme intrusiveness of a digital surveillance
program likely runs afoul of the Constitution.
C. SAFEGUARDS AND PUBLIC TRUST

In addition to helping a pandemic surveillance program pass
constitutional muster, the implementation of safeguards might also work to
build public trust in the program. As our data show, distrust of public health
officials is related to viewing pandemic surveillance as more intrusive. And
more people expressed skepticism about the effectiveness of the monitoring
than thought it would help control the spread of the infection.209 This is
consistent with other work from April 2020 that similarly found skepticism
in the efficacy of contact tracing, with 60% of respondents saying that
government contact tracing would “not make much of a difference in limiting
the spread” of COVID-19.210
Other studies have also shown that Americans have, at best, mixed
views of deferring to public health experts on tracking. One survey study
from Spring 2020 found that about 60% of Americans would be willing to
voluntarily install a contact tracing application on their phones to mitigate
the spread of COVID-19, but only about one third said that they would use
such an application were it provided by a public health agency.211 Worse,
206

Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598.
See Altshuler & Hershkowitz, supra note 163 (describing how making contract tracing
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c/92ES-35XS]. Further, this study found that a slight majority was in favor of tracking those
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45%) or using cell phone data to enforce social contact restrictions (63% vs. 37%).
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other potential providers were not more popular; only about 20% would want
a technology company provider and under 15% a public university.212
Similarly, a study commissioned by CyberNews found that only 30% of
people would allow a state sponsored app to display their location to other
local residents if they contracted the virus.213
Collectively, these data show the problem of lacking a trusted data
intermediary. Even among those who think a digital contact tracing program
would be useful, there is no consensus about who should run it. Our data
show that the public seems most concerned about such data being repurposed
by governments or technology companies in a way that violates their
privacy.214 One way to gain public trust in health surveillance programs is to
counteract that concern by having the government publicly and credibly
commit to a limited program and establish procedures such that this promise
can be kept.
Building in safeguards from the beginning will never guarantee the
absence of privacy risk, but it can minimize potential costs of pandemic
surveillance. A recent study by the authors shows that, to date, law
enforcement has not taken on a significant role with regards to COVID-19,
but that does not mean it could not or would not in the future.215 The potential
efficiencies of digital contact tracing and digital quarantine enforcement are
large. Neither is occurring in the United States right now, but maybe they
should be. That is a valid policy choice. But we should not forget the
constitutional guarantee of reasonableness as we build these programs. Too
easily one could create a regime where the tools of mass surveillance are
being used to monitor anyone who leaves their home for purposes beyond
public health, and to keep this surveillance going for years to come.
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CONCLUSION
Despite the depths of this crisis, Americans still perceived COVID-19
surveillance to be more intrusive than surveillance aimed at general crime
control, and therefore worthy of greater regulation. At the very least, we
should respond to these public privacy concerns by constructing safeguards
that limit the uses of pandemic surveillance data and explaining to the public
just how we plan to use these data during this new normal.
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APPENDIX
Demographics of the samples
April, 2020
N = 1,178

June, 2020
N = 1,197

Census216

% Female
51.6
50.5
50.8
% Male
48.0
49.3
49.2
% Other
.4
.3
Age (years)
Median
48
48
Mean
47.24 (17.56)
47.46 (17.43)
Political Orientation (1–7)217
4.08
(1.76)
4.00
(1.77)
Race/Ethnicity (%)
White
77.2
75.9
76.3
Black or AA
12.7
14.1
13.4
Indian or Native
.7
.8
1.3
SE Asian
5.9
5.9
5.9
Hawaiian/Pacific
.3
.3
.2
Multiracial or Other
3.1
3.0
2.8
Hispanic (%)
16.4
17.9
18.5
Education
Less than HS
9.3
11.0
10.9
HS Diploma/GED
29.9
28.2
28.6
Two-Year College
28.7
28.4
28.2
Four-Year College
20.5
20.8
20.6
Graduate Degree
11.6
11.6
11.6
Notes: For age and political orientation, the numbers in parentheses represent
standard deviations. Hispanic identity was assessed in a separate question.

216

Ethnicity and gender statistics are from the Census.gov website. Quick Facts, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts//fact//table//US//PST045217 [https://
perma.cc/HM2A-QBZC]. Educational attainment was calculated from data in Educational
Attainment in the United States: 2018, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Feb. 21, 2019),
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2018/demo/education-attainment/cps-detailedtables.html [https://perma.cc/XJ3N-AQDZ]. Note that the demographic numbers do not sum
to 100% due to rounding.
217
Political orientation was assessed on a scale ranging from 1-Very Liberal to 7-Very
Conservative.
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Table 1A: Wave 1 intrusiveness of different searches depending on search
context
Police
investigation
58.77a

Public
Health/
Pandemic
74.41b

Police/
Stay-athome
72.25b

(31.94)

(28.61)

(28.99)

Cell phone records of who was at a
particular location at a particular time

63.04a

70.52b

70.55b

(31.24)

(28.60)

(28.89)

Cell phone location data to trace whose
phones were near a certain person (day)

63.42a

72.22b

71.56b

(30.00)

(28.30)

(28.86)

Credit card charges from CC company
to track movements (month)

60.75a

78.08b

74.37b

(32.00)

(26.46)

(28.82)

Use facial recognition to match images
of people in public park

50.13a

67.01c

59.52b

(33.34)

(31.32)

(33.90)

Power usage data from utility to see if
consistent with person at home

59.11a

69.21b

70.76b

(32.88)

(30.39)

(29.74)

Drone recording video of people who
are outside

58.23a

64.67b

59.45ab

(33.12)

(33.14)

(32.51)

Cell phone location data tracking a
phone’s movements (month)

Notes: Means not sharing subscripts differ significantly at the p < .05 level. Numbers
in parentheses are standard deviations.
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Table 2A: Wave 2 intrusiveness of different searches depending on search
context
Police
investigation
56.32a

Public
Health/
Pandemic
72.50b

Police/
Stay-athome
73.31b

(31.97)

(28.07)

(27.47)

Cell phone records of who was at a
particular location at a particular time

58.78a

68.34b

70.01b

(31.75)

(29.36)

(29.01)

Cell phone location data to trace whose
phones were near a certain person (day)

60.07a

68.79b

71.24b

(31.97)

(28.81)

(28.61)

Credit card charges from CC company
to track movements (month)

57.51a

76.67b

76.85b

(32.14)

(26.98)

(26.74)

Use facial recognition to match images
of people in public park

50.54a

66.82b

63.99b

(32.68)

(29.54)

(31.07)

Power usage data from utility to see if
consistent with person at home

55.95a

70.45b

70.95b

(32.85)

(28.57)

(29.85)

Drone recording video of people who
are outside

55.05a

67.25b

63.63b

(32.68)

(30.47)

(31.36)

Cell phone location data tracking a
phone’s movements (month)

Notes: Means not sharing subscripts differ significantly at the p < .05 level. Numbers
in parentheses are standard deviations.
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Table 3A: Wave 2 reasonable expectations of privacy of different searches
depending on search context
Police
investigation
3.21a

Public
Health/
Pandemic
3.84b

Police/
Stay-athome
3.86b

(1.35)

(1.26)

(1.30)

Cell phone records of who was at a
particular location at a particular time

3.30a

3.66b

3.71b

(1.38)

(1.28)

(1.30)

Cell phone location data to trace whose
phones were near a certain person (day)

3.31a

3.74b

3.82b

(1.36)

(1.24)

(1.25)

Credit card charges from CC company
to track movements (month)

3.15a

4.06b

3.94b

(1.39)

(1.19)

(1.32)

Use facial recognition to match images
of people in public park

2.91a

3.64b

3.44b

(1.40)

(1.30)

(1.40)

Power usage data from utility to see if
consistent with person at home

3.20a

3.82b

3.84b

(1.37)

(1.26)

(1.31)

Drone recording video of people who
are outside

3.08a

3.64b

3.50b

(1.43)

(1.34)

(1.35)

Cell phone location data tracking a
phone’s movements (month)

Notes: Means not sharing subscripts differ significantly at the p < .05 level. Numbers
in parentheses are standard deviations.
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Table 4A: Wave 1 percentage of people believing a warrant or court order
should be required

Cell phone location data tracking a
phone’s movements (month)
Cell phone records of who was at a
particular location at a particular time
Cell phone location data to trace whose
phones were near a certain person (day)
Credit card charges from CC company to
track movements (month)
Use facial recognition to match images of
people in public park
Power usage data from utility to see if
consistent with person at home
Drone recording video of people who are
outside

Police
investigation

Public
Health/
Pandemic

Police/
Stay-athome

66.3%

72.4%

79.0%

66.3%

70.6%

73.6%

67.4%

68.8%

76.3%

69.7%

77.1%

80.5%

43.2%

63.8%

55.8%

65.0%

70.6%

74.8%

56.8%

58.3%

55.6%
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Table 5A: Percentage of people above and below the midpoint on the
reasonable expectation of privacy scale by condition
Law Enforcement
Law Enforcement

Public Health

Stay-at-Home

Below

Above

Below

Above

Below

Above

Cell phone location
data tracking a
phone’s movements
(month)

31.9%

43.5%

15.2%

66.0%

15.0%

65.3%

Cell phone records
of who was at a
particular location
at a particular time

26.2%

48.0%

17.9%

59.1%

18.0%

59.8%

Cell phone location
data to trace whose
phones were near a
certain person (day)

26.2%

47.0%

16.0%

62.2%

15.8%

63.2%

Credit card charges
from CC company
to track movements
(month)

32.2%

43.8%

11.9%

71.8%

14.5%

68.1%

Use facial
recognition to
match images of
people in public
park

41.7%

33.0%

20.0%

55.3%

26.8%

49.3%

Power usage data
from utility to see if
consistent with
person at home

30.5%

44.9%

16.6%

61.3%

17.5%

63.5%

Drone recording
video of people who
are outside

32.5%

4.04%

23.8%

55.5%

24.7%

49.1%

Notes: Participants were asked to rate whether the search “violated a reasonable
expectation of privacy” on a scale ranging from Definitely Not (1) – Definitely Yes
(5). Responses above the midpoint (3) indicate agreement with the notion that
privacy was violated. Responses below the midpoint indicate disagreement.

